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13 December 1965

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151



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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13 December 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

[REDACTED]

25X1

2. Indonesia: Sukarno, while apparently resigned to destruction of PKI, is fighting for preservation of Communist ideas for Indonesia. (Page 3)

[REDACTED]

25X1

4. Uruguay: Majority of government reportedly considering an early break in relations with USSR. (Page 6)

[REDACTED]

25X1

6. Note: Africa-Rhodesia-UK. (Page 9)

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008600400001-2

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008600400001-2

Indonesia: President Sukarno, while apparently resigned to the destruction of the PKI, is fighting to ensure an influential role for Communist ideas on the Indonesian political scene.

In two speeches on 11 December Sukarno, while warning the army against complacency over the PKI "tactic" of voluntary dissolution of its branches, argued that "there would no longer be an Indonesia" without Communist ideology. Sukarno declared that the KOM in NASAKOM--his acronym for the fusion respectively of nationalist, religious, and Marxist concepts--would "continue to hold the heart of the majority of the Indonesian people."

A 10 December editorial in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry newspaper gave further indication that the PKI, if not Communism as an ideology, is a spent political force within Indonesia. The editorial assumed the imminent formal banning of the PKI but stated that Indonesia could remain on its leftist course without the assistance of a Communist party. It added that the Indonesian political philosophy "existed long before Marx was born or Lenin stole a train ride to St. Petersburg."

25X1 [redacted] PKI Third Deputy Chairman Njoto has been executed by the army. Njoto, who following the coup attempt remained in Djakarta apparently under palace protection, was reportedly placed under army arrest in late November.

Following a 10 December meeting with US Ambassador Green, Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito issued a statement contrasting sharply to previous propaganda releases concerning US-Indonesian relations. While the statement cannot be viewed as signaling a basic switch in Indonesian foreign policy, it is indicative of the changing political climate in Djakarta.

(continued)

13 Dec 65

3

Suwito, who has been mentioned as a likely replacement to Foreign Minister Subandrio should he be forced out by the army, declared that the US now has a "better understanding of the Indonesian revolution." He also stated that the US is searching for a peaceful settlement to the Vietnam situation--the first non-hostile Indonesian statement concerning US presence in Vietnam in recent history.

25X1

13 Dec 65

4

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008600400001-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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Uruguay: The majority faction of the government is reportedly considering an early break in relations with the USSR because of alleged Soviet interference in the unsettled Uruguayan labor scene.

Such a decision, which may be taken today or tomorrow, would be a marked departure from past official toleration of Communist activity in Uruguay, which has long served as a center for Communist propaganda and other operations in South America. The USSR and all other Eastern European countries maintain diplomatic and trade missions in Montevideo, except East Germany which has only a trade mission there.

[The threat to break relations may be intended to extract a more cooperative policy from the Communist-influenced labor movement.] Protracted labor agitation, which forced the government to reimpose emergency security measures on 7 December, intensified last week. Most government employees engaged in a series of strikes and slow-downs, and on Thursday virtually paralyzed all but emergency services. Scattered incidents of violence and sabotage have occurred, as workers continue to protest government enforcement of penalties imposed on those who took part in strikes in October. Police have arrested several hundred striking bank and press employees.

[The non-Communist public employees' union apparently has ended its strike, and the larger Communist-dominated union for public employees is reportedly nearing acceptance of a government proposal to spread wage sanctions over an extended period of time.]

[The Uruguayan Communist Party, which reportedly believes that it still has considerable freedom of operation, has not canceled plans to instigate another general strike on 14 December, although strict enforcement of the security measures may considerably reduce the

13 Dec 65

6

25X1

effectiveness of such action. The government's firmness in dealing with labor unrest reflects the concern of leaders who believe that the major issue is now "who governs the country."

25X1

25X1

13 Dec 65

7

25X1

25X1

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NOTE

Africa-Rhodesia-UK: [Implementation by most of the member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) resolution of 5 December to break relations with London will probably be delayed well beyond the 15 December deadline. The Ethiopian Emperor, Kenya's President Kenyatta, and Nigeria's Premier Balewa have voiced publicly the misgivings felt by most African leaders about the resolution. Their calls for additional discussion of the Rhodesian problem under Commonwealth, UN, or OAU auspices should provide a face-saving way out. However impetuous, the ultimatum did reflect the intense Africa-wide emotion about Rhodesia, and any retreat from it without some meaningful action by the UK will only add to African frustration.]

25X1

13 Dec 65

9

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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